ࡱ> EHBCD jbjbjWW 4==`,  Uk800000000$w25P:0:0O0"""V0"0""r*T+7 fP+0e000^+i5D"|i5+i5+":0:0"0i5 : GOVERNANCE, GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN SELECTED WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES: A RECONSIDERATION OF THE EVIDENCE By Akpan H. EKPO ABSTRACT In the last 15 years, most countries in the West African sub-region have experimented democratic governance (representative democracy); elections have been held more than once, for example in Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, Cote DIvoire, Togo, Benin, The Gambia, Liberia and Sierra Leone with marginal violence. The growth rates of about 7 percent and macroeconomic stability have been attributed to the practice of democratic governance in the countries. The preliminary results show that democracy, inflation and public sector investment are positively related to the growth of per capita income. However, the lack of data prevents a more rigorous testing of the stated hypotheses. Keywords: Governance, Growth, West Africa JEL CLASSIFICATION: H11, 011 INTRODUCTION Governance, whether good or bad drives economic growth and development. It is generally accepted that growth whether inclusive or not is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for development. Invariably, governance may enhance growth but not development. In the period of the 1960s, many African countries experienced impressive growth rates with governance in place yet development remained inclusive. There exist in the literature ideas that good governance promotes growth? Does it follow, therefore, that bad governance does not promote growth? It depends on who defines good governance and what is meant by good governance? In recent times it is not uncommon to ascribe the practice of representative governance and /or western style democracy to connote good governance. Hence, for example, the holding of election every four to five years to elect representatives of the people, the right to vote and be voted for, human rights, etc would be perceived as some semblance of good governance. Good governance is also seen to be part of ensuring the efficiency of markets, promoting competition and minimizing the role of the state. These issues still remain controversial in the literature. Countries in the West African sub-region have had their own share of different types of governance and its implications on growth and development. In the early 1960s, some of the countries (Ghana, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal) had elected parliaments with strong leadership. During the period, growth rates were generally impressive and there was the political will to progress and show-case the attainment of political independence. For example, the then President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, initiated and completed several developmental projects confirming that he was not only indeed ahead of his time but one of the few visionary African leaders of that time. Few years after independence, there were military coups in most of the countries in the sub region; Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal were exceptions. Hence, in most of the countries, military dictatorship was the order of the day; the military pundits were not benevolent but were more interested in looting the treasuries of their various countries while running the economies with discretion rather than with rules. Most of the countries in the sub-region had growth rates far less than the population growth rates, some countries experienced stagnation and negative growth rates during the middle 1970s up to early 1980s. The introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) did not reverse the declining and non-satisfactory performance of most of the economies of the sub-region during the period of SAP. The point being made here is that in spite of the complexities of governance, a major economic reform such as SAP was formulated and implemented. From the 1960s to the present, Nigeria has fought a civil war, Sierra-Leone and Liberia have had their own share of internal conflicts, Cote d'Ivoire experienced a bitter conflict after an election; several military coups and counter-coups in Guinea-Bissau, Burkina Faso and Mali. However, in the last ten (10) to fifteen (15) years, most of the countries in the West African sub-region have and are implementing democratic governance (representative democracy); elections have been held more than once, for example, in Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, Togo, Benin, The Gambia, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra-Leone etc with marginal violence; most of the elections were adjudged by international and nations observers to be free and fair. Can the satisfactory growth rate in the sub-region and macroeconomic stability be attributed to the practice of democratic governance? The paper attempts to ascertain empirically whether democratic governance has a positive relationship with growth and development in the selected West African Countries. Has democratic governance impacted positively on the standard of living of citizens? What has happened to education, health, and employment during the period of democratic governance? The paper is organized as follows: section 2 briefly discuses the styled facts while section 3 examines the literature review, concepts and methodology. The empirical analysis is provided in section 4 while section 5 concludes the paper. It is expected that the discussion in the paper would assist policy-makers and other stakeholders in making decisions on how democratic governance can enhance economic development. GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT: STYLIZED FACTS Economists generally agree that governance is one of the crucial factors determining the growth prospects of all economies. In other words, governance is growth enhancing. Table 1 below summarizes the growth of output in selected West African countries for the period 2000-2011. During the period 2000-2005, Sierra-Leone registered the highest growth rate of 12.1 percent followed by Cape Verde and Nigeria with 5.75 percent and 5.30 percent respectively. Guinea Bissau registered a negative growth rate of -1.25 percent during the period 2000-2005. It is interesting to note that during the period of the global economic downturn, almost all the countries had on the average impressive growth rates except for Niger and Cote d'Ivoire which had negative growth rates of -4.7percent in 2011 and -0.9 percent in 2009. In 2007, Ghana showed an output growth rate of 6.1 percent at the height of the global economic crisis; The Gambia 6.3percent while Liberia 9.5percent during the same period. These growth rates were driven by mineral and commodity exports. Table: 1 Growth of Output in Selected West African Countries 2000 2011 (%) Country2000-2005 Average200620072008200920102011Cape Verde5.7510.87.85.94.17.15.0The Gambia4.606.56.35.94.66.13.3Ghana4.806.46.17.23.56.413.6Guinea2.902.51.84.00.32.43.6Liberia -7.89.57.14.66.86.4Nigeria 5.306.16.45.35.66.47.2Sierra Leone12.107.46.45,54.06.05.3Benin-3.64.65.02.73.83.1Burkina Faso4.905.53.65.03.25.25.6Cote divoire5.120.71.62.33.72.4-4.7Guinea-Bissau-1.250.62.73.33.02.65.3Mali1.305.34.35.04.55.02.7Niger 4.765.83.39.5-0.94.92.3Senegal 3.202.44.72.51.53.62.6Togo4.613.91.91.02.54.16.8Source: WAIFEM Annual Report, Various issues The data on table 2 below show that all the countries experienced macroeconomic stability using the rate of inflation as a proxy. In 2005, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra-Leone registered double-digits rates of inflation; all the other countries had single digit rates of inflation. During the period of global economic crisis (2007-2008), the same countries except Nigeria had double-digits inflation; except for Guinea, the rates of inflation in all the countries were within their inflation threshold (WAMI, 2011). It is possible that both the growth in output and the acceptable rates of inflation were due to efforts by all the countries to a better macroeconomic management. For example, in Nigeria, beginning in 1999 with the promulgation of both the Fiscal Responsibility and Procurement Acts, policy-makers relied more on rules than discretion. All the other countries passed Procurement Acts to ensure the proper management of contracts; the debit profile of most of the selected countries were within their acceptable thresholds of key debt indicators (Ekpo and Omoruyi; 2013; Ekpo, 2012). Nonetheless, rigidities in these economies remain a challenge. TABLE 2: Rate of Inflation in Selected West African Countries (%) Country2005 200620072008200920102011Cape Verde0.44.84.46.81.22.14.5The Gambia5.02.15.44.54.65.04.8Ghana15.110.210.716.519.310.78.7Guinea31.434.722.918.44.715.521.5Liberia 6.97.213.717.57.47.38.5Nigeria 17.98.25.411.612.413.710.8Sierra Leone12.09.511.814.89.217.818.5Benin5.43.81.38.02.22.12.7Burkina Faso6.42.4-0.210.72.6-0.62.7Cote divoire3.92.61.96.31.01.41.9Guinea-Bissau5.6-0.14.610.4-1.71.15.0Mali6.41.59.111.32.21.33.1Niger 7.80.10.111.34.30.92.9Senegal 1.72.15.95.8-1.11.23.4Togo6.82.21.08.72.03.23.6Source. 2011 Annual Report , WAIFEM, Lagos As part of the governance scenario, most of the countries that successfully caught up economically with the developed countries either delayed democratization or kept the same ruling party during the period of growth. Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Chile before the late 1980s and China, until presently followed the first strategy while Japan, Germany and Italy after world war II are examples of the second approach (Polterovich and Popov, 2007). The selected West African Countries began to experiment western type democracy (governance structure) in a relatively continuous basis in the last 12 years; within that context, most of the ruling parties, except for Ghana and Senegal have remained in power over the entire period. Corruption indices provide some measure of government effectiveness which is a proxy for good governance. Table 3 below shows that all the selected countries except Cape Verde scored very low in corruption perception index (CPI) as measured by Transparency International. A comparison with Botswana shows that the selected West African countries still have corruption and rent-seeking as challenges. It could be inferred that if corruption is reduced to the barest minimum, the growth trajectories of these countries would increase. Table 3: Corruption Indices for Selected West African Countries CountryRankScore 2001201320122013Cape Verde-416058Ghana 59634546Liberia -833638Benin -943636Togo-1233029Mali-1273428Cote divoire 771362927Nigeria 961442725Guinea-1502424Sierra Leone -1193330The Gambia -1273428Botswana-306564Source: Transparency International Notes: 0 = highly corrupt; 100 = very clean Ranking is out of 177 countries for 2013 While there are several drivers of growth in the sub-region, public spending on education as a ratio of government expenditure as well as life expectancy is shown in Table 4. It is clear that none of the selected countries met the United Nations threshold on public spending or education; the Gambia, Ghana and Togo are close to the threshold of 26 percent. Notwithstanding, the quality of public education is equally important but it is not captured in the available data. The life expectancy of all the countries improved when 1990 is compared to 2009-10. In all the countries except for Ghana, the life expectancy is below 60 years of age; this is still quite low. The data indirectly point to the unsatisfactory health care delivery system and other welfare provisions in the sub-region. Table 4: Drivers of Growth in Selected West African Countries (%) CountryPublic Spending on Education (% of growth Expenditure Life Expectancy2001 - 1019902009 - 10Cape Verde 14.4--Cote divoire20.850.254.7The Gambia 22.855.258.2Ghana 24.458.463.8Guinea -48.153.6Liberia -46.056.1Nigeria 17.046.351.4Senegal -55.759.0Sierra Leone -39.747.4Togo23.254.856.6 REVIEW OF LITERATURE, CONCEPTS AND METHODOLOGY It was generally perceived that liberalization would resolve governance issues such as rent seeking, rule of law and corruption. Consequently, reforming the state was an essential aspect of the Structural Adjustment Programme of the 1980s (Krueger, 1974; Bates, 2001). But the results of the structural adjustment in the 1980s were generally very poor; recessions followed in many African countries and growth was poor. More worrying was that despite significant liberalization and cutbacks in subsidies, together with privatization programmes in developing countries; there was little apparent reduction in rent seeking anywhere. In almost every country where liberalization was carried out, there appeared to be an increase in corruption and rend seeking(Harriss-White, 1996). The perspective of growth-enhancing governance is well discussed in (Khan, 2006). A series of papers examining good governance as either growth-enhancing and/or market-promoting is extant in the literature. It became important to ensure that good governance was necessary for maintaining efficient markets while restricting the activities of states to the provision of necessary public goods in order to minimize rent seeking and government failure. Democracy which is as old as the human race is linked to good governance; democracy broadly defined as popular participation was also practiced in the countries of the sub-region before the advent of colonial rule. It might have been different from the western type of democracy which itself evolved overtime. In present parlance, good governance has come to be associated with representative democracy as obtained in Europe and North America. Hence the foundation such as the parliamentary system in Britain; the presidential system in the USA as well as the local council in the Scandinavian countries are examples. In existence are also institutions and processes readily identifiable with modern representative democracy namely elections, political parties, separation of powers, and representative bodies among others. According to Cheema and Maguire, when most people hear the word governance they think of government. After-all, both have govern as their root word. But governance is about more than just government. It is a complex yet very universal force that exists in all societies. Governance is a neutral concept comprising the complex mechanism, processes, relationships, and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations and mediate their differences. It addresses the allocation and management of resources to respond to collective problems; it is characterised by the principles of participation, transparency, accountability, rule of law, effectiveness, equity and strategic vision. In reality, the practice of these principles remains a big challenge, partly because the state that is supposed to implement these principles may not represent the generality of the populace. The state may be the group in power and consequently the views of the dominant group which may ensure, for example, that elections are not free and fair, turn the other side against corruption etc. (Ekpo, 2011). A set of governance indicators have been developed (World Bank, 2007): Voice and accountability-measuring political, civil and human rights; Political stability and absence of violence capturing the likelihood of violent threats or changes in government including terrorism; Government effectiveness measuring the competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery; Regulatory quality measuring the incidence of market unfriendly policies ; Rule of law-capturing the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence; Control of corruption dealing with public power for private gain, including both petty and ground corruption and state capture. A useful and insightful examination of these indicators utilizing data for developing and developed world is in (Khan, 2012, pp. 120-136) However, to be judged good in the way it works government should: be based in the institutions that keep it responsive to the populace to be able to maintain the peace and to implement its decisions attempt to replicate only what it can efficiently and usefully regulate and do so in ways that are advantageous to the population be subjected consistently to rules of justice and public interest rather than being available at discretion for the benefit of any of those in power and authority. Are these indicators applicable to the countries of West Africa? Norman and Stiglitz(2012) ague that government in Africa would contribute to development opportunities if they are allowed to play an active role in promoting savings, education, technology, entrepreneurship, regulating banking and ensuring financial markets. In other words, to ensure good governance and development, the state must be prepared to implement the developmental state model with the dynamics of institutional and political dimensions in collaboration with the market. METHODOLOGY We can use econometrics techniques to analyze the relationship between growth, development, and the various forms of governance as discussed above. The big challenge is the availability of data on a consistent basis for the fifteen countries for the period under study. Arising from the concepts and review of literature, the broad relationships are stated thus: Y = f (dem, RL, Xi) (3.1) Where: Y = growth rate of GDP per capita; RL = rule of law dem =democratization Xi = control variables such as average population growth, share of investment in GDP. One of the short-comings is that the rule of law indices is only available for recent years and for some countries. It is also possible to regress the rule of law on democratization as well as the interaction between democratization and corruption. RL = g(dem, dem. CPI, Xi) (3.2) Where: CPI = Corruption Perception Index; dem.CPI are interactive variables Corruption could be viewed as a proxy for law and order: CPI = v(y, dem.CPI, Xi) (3.3) let us consider some macroeconomic implications such as the relationship between the size of the government and democratization as well as the rate of inflation. The institutional capacity of a state is determined by the efficiency of the government, measured as the provision of public goods per value of government spending and the share of revenues in GDP Thus: Rev = g(y, dem, LD, Xi) (3.4) Where: Rev = share of revenue in GDP; LD= level of democracy. Good governance (representative democracy) contributes to inflation; periods before and after elections in countries in the sub-region are characterized by huge spending to finance not just the election processes and its inherent bureaucracy but also to entice the electorate by suddenly engaging in development projects. The relationship can be stated as: P = f(dem, Ld, Xi) (3.5) Where: P = inflation. In estimating the above relationships, even if the data challenges are resolved, the problems of thresholds for the interaction variables as well as that of endogeneity need to be addressed. 4. EMPIRICS OF GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT For the period 1965-2011 with data for selected countries, the results of the estimated equations are: Y = 0.146 + .057dem + 0.012P + .096Inv (3.6) (0.285) (4.370)* (0.507) (1.712)* R2 = .80; adjusted R2 = .71; D.W = 1.92 t scores are in parenthesis. Inv = public investment in GDP. Y = 1.134 + 0.002dem -0.001P (3.7) (517.4)* (.181)* (-0.371) R2 = .96; adjusted R2 = .95; *significance at 5%; **significance at 10%. Based on equations (3.6) and (3.7), democracy has a positive impact on development and is statistically significant. Both inflation and public sector investment are positively related to the growth of income per capita in equation (3.6). The fixed effects confirm that the countries though developing have different structure and challenges. The pooled panel results of equation (3.7) without public sector investment indicate that inflation is negatively related to the growth in per capita income suggesting some evidence of macroeconomic instability. The results of the fixed effects suggest that other factors may explain the relationship between growth of income per capita and inflation and democracy. The economies with positive fixed effects (Benin, Cote DIvoire, Guinea, Sierra-Leone and Togo) tend to grow with or without democracy. It is not surprising that countries with high corruption perception index have negative fixed effects. These results are preliminary and should be interpreted with caution. The other results are presented in the appendix. 5. CONCLUSION We have examined governance and development in selected West African countries during the period 1965-2011; stylized facts show that the countries grew on the average by 5.5 per cent while the rates of inflation were within the acceptable thresholds. No country met the UN threshold of 26 per cent expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP. However, life expectancy improved between 1990 and 2010 in all the countries. The preliminary panel results confirm that democracy, inflation and public sector investment are positively related to the growth in per capita income. When public sector investment is dropped, inflation becomes negatively related to the growth of per capita income though not statistically significant. The mixed fixed effect results suggest that other factors such as corruption, openness, population growth etc other than democracy may explain the growth of per capita income. The regression results are preliminary and hence should be interpreted with caution. REFERENCES Bates, R. H. (2001) Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development. New York: W.W Norton. Cheema, G.S and Linder Maguise (2006) Democracy, Governance and Development: A conceptual framework, Processed. UNDP Ekpo, Akpan H (2011) Theoretical Basis for Planning in Nigeria: Evidence From a Petroleum-Export Economy, Nigerian Journal Of Economic and Social Studies, vol. 53, No.3, pp.311-324. Ekpo, Akpan H and S. Bello (2012) Fiscal Performance and Economic Integration in ECOWAS: Evidence from selected countries in Ekpo, A.H (ed.) Post Crisis Economic Reforms: Implications for Sustained Economic Development in ECOWASW, Advencomplus, Lagos. Fosu, A. K (2012) The African Economic Growth Record and the Roles of Policy Syndromes and Governance. Good Growth and Governance in Africa: Rethinking Development strategies. Oxford: University Press. Harriss-White B(1996) Liberalization and Corruption: Resolving the Paradox IDS Bulletin , 27, (2): 31-9. Kaufman, D et al (2005) Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1960-2004. Retrieved from World Bank on line. Khan, M. H (2012) Governance and Development: The Perspective of Growth-enhancing Governance in Good Growth and Governance in Africa: Rethinking Development Strategies. Krueger, A.O. (1974) The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, Review 64 (3): 291-303 Norman, A , Botchmey, et al (2012) Good Growth and Governance in Africa: Rethinking Development Strategies, Oxford: University Press. Dependent Variable: LogYMethod: Panel Least SquaresDate: 12/26/13 Time: 21:42Sample: 1961 2011Periods included: 51Cross-sections included: 15Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 489VariableCoefficientStd. Errort-StatisticProb.C11.134940.021520517.41550.0000DEM0.0019960.0009152.1813210.0297INFL(P)-0.0004690.001265-0.3705390.7111Effects SpecificationCross-section fixed (dummy variables)R-squared0.962201Mean dependent var11.12705Adjusted R-squared0.960920S.D. dependent var1.895035S.E. of regression0.374624Akaike info criterion0.908359Sum squared resid66.24204Schwarz criterion1.054106Log likelihood-205.0939Hannan-Quinn criter.0.965604F-statistic750.9453Durbin-Watson stat0.326441Prob(F-statistic)0.000000 FIXEDEffectBenin0.575574Burkina Faso0.587197Cape Verde-0.739779Cote Divoire1.832065The Gambia-1.833816Ghana-4.515718Guinea2.409230Guinea Bissau1.291963Liberia-2.635964Mali0.119421Niger0.451268Nigeria-0.193490Senegal1.484940Sierra Leone2.632155Togo1.367272  Paper presented at the and African Finance Economic Association Conference Philadelphia, USA 3- 6, January, 2014  Professor of Economics and Director General, WAIFEM Lagos: Views expressed are solely mine; the usual disclaimer applies.  Economic Community of West African States include: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote dIvoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea , Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.      PAGE \* MERGEFORMAT 15  hijmn{|}, - W s t u  + F ί~rjbZbZRJhCJaJh \tCJaJhf~CJaJhYTCJaJhXqCJaJh \thR5CJaJ h^hO0hO0h^hwCJaJh^CJaJh \t5CJaJhz15CJaJ$jh \thHx0J5CJUaJh \th \t5CJaJh \thz15CJaJjhHx0J5CJUaJh^5CJaJhHxhz15CJaJjn}~- W t u 2$ & Fgdb^gd? $^a$gd(0$a$gd }R$a$gd $`a$gd~  & Fr^rgd \tgdO0$a$gd^$a$gdHx$a$gd \tF ] \ :Iw ,Fj{+踰舀xppppppphMCJaJhCJaJhCCJaJhCJaJhpSCJaJhaCJaJh>(CJaJh GTCJaJh/A:CJaJh(CJaJhrCJaJh"WCJaJh_TCJaJhl"CJaJhTCJaJh \tCJaJh6CJaJhHxCJaJ*+012Z[\d +JLMjkZrºʯʟʗwohV7CJaJh;nCJaJhCJaJh1yCJaJhCJaJha|sCJaJhGCJaJhCJaJhhCJaJhCJaJh>^CJaJh }RCJaJjh0JCJUaJh}CJaJh-CJaJhCCJaJhgv8CJaJ)34;@A%7:'9ZrŽ}ummme]UhlCJaJh CJaJhuCJaJhgCJaJhqCJaJhd[CJaJhb)CJaJhz"CJaJh)<CJaJh[CJaJha[CJaJhARCJaJhk CJaJhH_ CJaJh?CJaJhhCJaJh }RCJaJhCJaJhPCJaJhi"CJaJh(0CJaJ!#$4U~+;Z$-g<\|qŽݝ}}uumeh^CJaJhT[CJaJhaCJaJh*eCJaJh+_RCJaJh CJaJh9lCJaJh "CJaJhxCJaJhb/CJaJhYYCJaJh(0CJaJhmdCJaJh5CJaJhvCJaJhhCJaJhCJaJhlCJaJh }RCJaJ%B}$>RmX|Q{|tld\l\Th {CJaJh:}CJaJh5=CJaJhqCJaJh)vCJaJh:CJaJh~CJaJhRBCJaJhWO%CJaJhh\ACJaJ{     ' 5 6 C D #!D!E!G!H!I!J!K!Q!S!!ŽŽŽŵ}rf]fhQ5CJaJhsh~5CJaJhMhsCJaJhCJaJhCCJaJh6nCJaJhJ XCJaJhcCJaJhUCJaJh:ACJaJh5_ CJaJh^CJaJhX CJaJhq䴳󰿲䴳䴳w䴳䴳$䴳䴳Z䴳2a2b2j2l2222233333344̽̽۵zrh7CJaJhM=CJaJhzCJaJhCJaJhrDCJaJhZWhwpCJaJhZWCJaJh7{CJaJhsCJaJhx{h7{CJaJmH sH hx{hsCJaJmH sH  hx{h7{hx{h7{CJaJmH sH hx{hsCJaJmH sH )222K3d$Ifgdx{l kdT&$$Iflr r# (iU< t0644 lahytx{22"2%2(2$d$If^a$gdx{l (2)222K3d$Ifgdx{l kdf'$$Iflr r# (iU< t0644 lahytx{224272:2=2$d$If^a$gdx{l =2>2b2j22K??4 $ & Fa$gds $h^ha$gdwpkdx($$Iflr r# (iU< t0644 lahytx{222555566!6X6h6$d$If^a$gdx{l $h^ha$gd?v$hh^h`ha$gd?v $ & Fa$gdZW 44U444<5W5p55555555666]6g6h6i666666666ȜxhxaRKRKRKRK hx{hhx{hCJaJmH sH  hx{hshx{h5CJaJmH sH hx{hs5CJaJmH sH hYZCJaJhQhg5CJaJhQhs5CJaJhQCJaJhgCJaJhn$CJaJhPCJaJhZWCJaJha&CJaJh`BCJaJh.+CJaJhQ6=CJaJh7CJaJh?vCJaJh6i6j6t6y66qRRRR$d$If^a$gdx{l kd)$$IflFw #{   t06    44 lahytx{666666^????$d$If^a$gdx{l kd8*$$Ifl\w L#{  7b t0644 lahytx{666666^????$d$If^a$gdx{l kd+$$Ifl\w L#{  7b t0644 lahytx{666666^????$d$If^a$gdx{l kd+$$Ifl\w L#{  7b t0644 lahytx{666666^????$d$If^a$gdx{l kd,$$Ifl\w L#{  7b t0644 lahytx{6666777.7/7D7E7_7`7t7u7v7w7x7777777J8j8q88999959K9L9a99999:::':L:\:ƽڵڭ}uuuhGCJaJh \tCJaJhXCJaJhu'CJaJhy?DCJaJhbgCJaJh?vCJaJhCJaJhZWCJaJhZW5CJaJh?vhg5CJaJhYZCJaJhgCJaJhsCJaJ hx{hhx{hCJaJmH sH -666666^????$d$If^a$gdx{l kd-$$Ifl\w L#{  7b t0644 lahytx{67 7 777^????$d$If^a$gdx{l kd.$$Ifl\w L#{  7b t0644 lahytx{777$7)7.7^????$d$If^a$gdx{l kdx/$$Ifl\w L#{  7b t0644 lahytx{.7/787:7?7D7^????$d$If^a$gdx{l kdX0$$Ifl\w L#{  7b t0644 lahytx{D7E7S7U7Z7_7^????$d$If^a$gdx{l kd81$$Ifl\w L#{  7b t0644 lahytx{_7`7e7j7o7t7^????$d$If^a$gdx{l kd2$$Ifl\w L#{  7b t0644 lahytx{t7u7v7w7x77^RIIA & Fgdgh^hgdb $h^ha$gd?vkd3$$Ifl\w L#{  7b t0644 lahytx{\:~::::::;5;N;;;;6<u<<<<<L===== >1>>>>>>?Шx󸿶ĸݱ󲵱䴳&䴳䴳<CJaJhCJaJh%CJaJhQCJaJh?wCJaJhi!CJaJhCJaJhk"KCJaJh=ouCJaJh"CJaJhQ|CJaJhC (CJaJhCJaJhCJaJh:/CJaJhTJCJaJh&CJaJhZWCJaJhfn\CJaJ7;v<@A3D{DDIEE FFGGG+HkHH & FgdQ & FgdgdQ $ & Fa$gd& $ & Fa$gdQ$a$gd&p^pgd?&$&^`&a$gd&$&^`&a$gd?v?%?A????????+@3@H@@@@@GA}AA6BBBBBBB CCC5CQC^Cxxxpph`XhlCJaJh1CJaJhCJaJh CJaJhCJaJhNCJaJhCJaJh?&CJaJhdCJaJhCJaJh#CJaJhYCJaJhmCJaJhNRQCJaJhrCJaJhkCJaJhCJaJh \tCJaJhr:CJaJhSCJaJhoCJaJ ^CCCCCCD$D0DHDgDrDxD{DDDDDDDDD E3EHEIEbEcEdEEtldYNNhQhWG_CJaJhQh)2HCJaJh)2HCJaJhCJaJhQh_wCJaJhQCJaJhQhQCJaJhQhQCJaJhQhICJaJhICJaJhCJaJh^sCJaJhQCJaJhcQCJaJhCCJaJh1CJaJhBCJaJh-5CJaJhkCJaJh9CJaJEEEE FrFFFFFGGGGGG*H+HLHjHkHHHI:IIIIIIIII%JVJKK4M;MGM]M_MeMfMhMiMlMmMyMMMMMMϿϿϿϿhoT8CJPJaJh NCJPJaJh NCJaJhoT8CJaJhhQ5CJaJho CJaJhQCJaJhCJaJhhQCJaJhQhQCJaJhDCJaJhCJaJhQhDCJaJ5HIIKK4M`MhMMMM NO&OrOOO:Q\QeQQQSSgd \t$a$gdoT8$a$gd \tgdQ$a$gdM $^a$gdQ $ & Fa$gdMMMMMMMMMMNNMNrN}N~NNO OOOOOOO ONOqOOOOOMP`PcPoPtP'Q,QAQQQ[QeQ{QRR=RST ZZ]]]^^\^q^ĹĢhw5CJaJhwCJaJh \thhCJaJh \th \t5CJaJh \th \tCJaJh \tCJaJhCJaJhoT8hoT8CJH*aJhhCJaJhoT8CJaJhQCJaJh NCJaJ9S$S3SSTTTTT U)UIUJUqUUUUU ZZ]]]]]]^r^$a$gd \tgdhgd \tgd \tq^r^^^^^T__.``aQakaaaaaa)b*bMbbbBc[cjckccccdd.d/dNdOdcddd{d|ddddddddde eeeee9e:e`eaeeļ޼ļ꜕ hx{h \t)hx{h \tB*CJOJQJ^JaJphhhhhCJaJhhCJaJhh5CJaJhw5CJaJhwCJaJh \th \t5CJaJh \th \tCJaJhwhwCJaJ:r^^_`kaaNbbkccccccdd$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \tgd \tdd,d-d.d/d-^kdm4$$IfF    4ayt \t$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \tKkd3$$If04ayt \t/dLdMdNdOdadbdcdx^kd4$$IfF    4ayt \t$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \tcdddydzd{dxx$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \t^kd5$$IfF    4ayt \t{d|ddddxx$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \t^kd6$$IfF    4ayt \tddddddx-xKkd87$$If04ayt \t$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \t^kd6$$IfF    4ayt \tdddddddddddekd7$$IfrN O4ayt \t$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \t dddddee{eKKKK$ d$7$8$H$If] a$gd \t$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \tkdz8$$IfyrN O4ayt \te e e e e ee{eeeee$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \tkd59$$IfrN O4ayt \teeeeeee{eeeee$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \tkd9$$IfrN O4ayt \teee e)e2e9e{eKKKK$ d$7$8$H$If] a$gd \t$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \tkd:$$IfyrN O4ayt \t9e:e>eGePeYe`e{eKKKK$ d$7$8$H$If] a$gd \t$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \tkdt;$$IfrN O4ayt \t`eaeiese|eee{eKKKK$ d$7$8$H$If] a$gd \t$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \tkd/<$$IfrN O4ayt \teeeeeee{eeeee$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \tkd<$$IfrN O4ayt \teeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee'f(fdfefffffggQgRgpgqgvgwg|g}g~gggggggggggggg h hhh6h7hIhJhYhZhjhkh}h~hhhhhhhhhh h`h \tCJOJQJ^JaJ hah \t h'6h \tCJOJQJ^JaJ)hx{h \tB*CJOJQJ^JaJph hx{h \tHeeeeeee{eeeee$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \tkd=$$IfrN O4ayt \teeeeee{eeee$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \tkdn>$$IfyrN O4ayt \teeeeeeexxxxx$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \tqkd)?$$If\O4ayt \teeeeeee{eeeee$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \tkd?$$IfrN O4ayt \teeee{hR$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \tkd@$$IfyrN O4ayt \teeeeeee$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \tKkdRA$$If04ayt \teeeeeee{eeeee$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \tkdA$$IfrN O4ayt \teeeff'f{hN7N d$7$8$H$If] gd \t$ d$7$8$H$If] a$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \tkdB$$IfyrN O4ayt \t'f(f;fDf[fdf{aJa d$7$8$H$If] gd \t$ d$7$8$H$If] a$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \tqkdOC$$If\N O4ayt \tdfefxffff{aJa d$7$8$H$If] gd \t$ d$7$8$H$If] a$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \tqkdC$$If\N O4ayt \tffffff{aJa d$7$8$H$If] gd \t$ d$7$8$H$If] a$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \tqkdD$$If\N O4ayt \tffffgg{aJa d$7$8$H$If] gd \t$ d$7$8$H$If] a$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \tqkd>E$$If\N O4ayt \tgg(g1gHgQg{aJa d$7$8$H$If] gd \t$ d$7$8$H$If] a$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \tqkdE$$If\N O4ayt \tQgRgdgmgngogpg{aGGG$ d$7$8$H$If] a$gd \t$ d$7$8$H$If] a$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \tqkdF$$If\N O4ayt \tpgqgrgsgtgugvg{eeeee$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \tkd-G$$IfrN O4ayt \tvgwgxgygzg{g|g{eeeee$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \tkdG$$IfrN O4ayt \t|g}gggg{v``$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \tgd \tkdH$$IfyrN O4ayt \tggggzd$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \trkdlI$$If0< !04ayt \tggggzd$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \trkd J$$If0< !04ayt \tggggzd$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \trkdJ$$If0< !04ayt \tggggzd$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \trkdFK$$If0< !04ayt \tggggzd$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \trkdK$$If0< !04ayt \tggh hzd$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \trkdL$$If0< !04ayt \t h hhhzd$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \trkd M$$If0< !04ayt \thh,h6hzd$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \trkdM$$If0< !04ayt \t6h7h?hIhzd$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \trkd\N$$If0< !04ayt \tIhJhOhYhzd$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \trkdN$$If0< !04ayt \tYhZh`hjhzd$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \trkdO$$If0< !04ayt \tjhkhsh}hzd$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \trkd6P$$If0< !04ayt \t}h~hhhzd$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \trkdP$$If0< !04ayt \thhhhzd$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \trkdrQ$$If0< !04ayt \thhhhzd$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \td$7$8$H$Ifgd \trkdR$$If0< !04ayt \thhhhww$d$7$8$H$Ifa$gd \trkdR$$If0< !04ayt \thhhhhhhhhhhhXiYizxxgdMh^hgdQgd \trkdLS$$If0< !04ayt \t hhhhhhhXiYiZiiiiii j!j/j3j:jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjȽнжжжжЫЗЧhMmHnHujh^UjhJUhJhh^mH sH  hh^hHxh^mH sH h^mH sH h^jh^0JUhMhCJaJhQCJaJh \thQCJaJh \t'YiiijjjjjjjjjjjjjjjgdM$a$ dgdHx21h:pqL. A!"#$% $$If!vh5z52555555#vz#v2#v#v:V l t0$&65z5255ytx{$$If!vh5z52555555#vz#v2#v#v:V l t0$&65z5255ytx{$$If!vh5z52555555#vz#v2#v#v:V l t0$&65z5255ytx{$$If!vh5z52555555#vz#v2#v#v:V l t0$&65z5255ytx{$$If!vh5z52555555#vz#v2#v#v:V l t0$&65z5255ytx{$$If!vh5z52555555#vz#v2#v#v:V l t0$&65z5255ytx{$$If!vh5z52555555#vz#v2#v#v:V l t0$&65z5255ytx{$$If!vh5z52555555#vz#v2#v#v:V l t0$&65z5255ytx{$$If!vh5z52555555#vz#v2#v#v:V l t0$&65z5255ytx{$$If!vh5z52555555#vz#v2#v#v:V l t0$&65z5255ytx{$$If!vh5z52555555#vz#v2#v#v:V l t0$&65z5255ytx{$$If!vh5z52555555#vz#v2#v#v:V l t0$&65z5255ytx{$$If!vh5z52555555#vz#v2#v#v:V l t0$&65z5255ytx{$$If!vh5z52555555#vz#v2#v#v:V l t0$&65z5255ytx{$$If!vh5z52555555#vz#v2#v#v:V l t0$&65z5255ytx{$$If!vh5z52555555#vz#v2#v#v:V l t0$&65z5255ytx{$$If!vh5z5555555#vz#v#v:V l t0$&65z55ytx{$$If!vh5z5555555#vz#v#v:V l t0$&65z55ytx{$$If!vh5z5555555#vz#v#v:V l t0$&65z55ytx{$$If!vh5z5555555#vz#v#v:V l t0$&65z55ytx{$$If!vh5z5555555#vz#v#v:V l t0$&65z55ytx{$$If!vh5z5555555#vz#v#v:V l t0$&65z55ytx{$$If!vh5z5555555#vz#v#v:V l t0$&65z55ytx{$$If!vh5z5555555#vz#v#v:V l t0$&65z55ytx{$$If!vh5z5555555#vz#v#v:V l t0$&65z55ytx{$$If!vh5z5555555#vz#v#v:V l t0$&65z55ytx{$$If!vh5z5555555#vz#v#v:V l t0$&65z55ytx{$$If!vh5z5555555#vz#v#v:V l t0$&65z55ytx{$$If!vh5z5555555#vz#v#v:V l t0$&65z55ytx{$$If!vh5z5555555#vz#v#v:V l t0$&65z55ytx{$$If!vh5z5555555#vz#v#v:V l t0$&65z55ytx{$$If!vh5z5555555#vz#v#v:V l t0$&65z55ytx{$$Ifh!vh5 5 5 #v #v :V l t065 5 ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5 5(5i5U5<#v #v(#vi#vU#v<:V l t065 5(5i5U5</ / / / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5 5(5i5U5<#v #v(#vi#vU#v<:V l t065 5(5i5U5</ / / / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5 5(5i5U5<#v #v(#vi#vU#v<:V l t065 5(5i5U5</ / / / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5 5(5i5U5<#v #v(#vi#vU#v<:V l t065 5(5i5U5</ / / / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5 5(5i5U5<#v #v(#vi#vU#v<:V l t065 5(5i5U5</ / / / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5 5(5i5U5<#v #v(#vi#vU#v<:V l t065 5(5i5U5</ / / / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5 5(5i5U5<#v #v(#vi#vU#v<:V l t065 5(5i5U5</ / / / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5 5(5i5U5<#v #v(#vi#vU#v<:V l t065 5(5i5U5</ / / / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5 5(5i5U5<#v #v(#vi#vU#v<:V l t065 5(5i5U5</ / / / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5 5(5i5U5<#v #v(#vi#vU#v<:V l t065 5(5i5U5</ / / / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5 5(5i5U5<#v #v(#vi#vU#v<:V l t065 5(5i5U5</ / / / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5 5(5i5U5<#v #v(#vi#vU#v<:V l t065 5(5i5U5</ / / / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5 5(5i5U5<#v #v(#vi#vU#v<:V l t065 5(5i5U5</ / / / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5{ 5 5 #v{ #v #v :V l t065{ 5 5 ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5{ 5 575b#v{ #v #v7#vb:V l t065{ 5 575b/ / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5{ 5 575b#v{ #v #v7#vb:V l t065{ 5 575b/ / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5{ 5 575b#v{ #v #v7#vb:V l t065{ 5 575b/ / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5{ 5 575b#v{ #v #v7#vb:V l t065{ 5 575b/ / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5{ 5 575b#v{ #v #v7#vb:V l t065{ 5 575b/ / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5{ 5 575b#v{ #v #v7#vb:V l t065{ 5 575b/ / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5{ 5 575b#v{ #v #v7#vb:V l t065{ 5 575b/ / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5{ 5 575b#v{ #v #v7#vb:V l t065{ 5 575b/ / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5{ 5 575b#v{ #v #v7#vb:V l t065{ 5 575b/ / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5{ 5 575b#v{ #v #v7#vb:V l t065{ 5 575b/ / / ahytx{$$Ifh!vh5{ 5 575b#v{ #v #v7#vb:V l t065{ 5 575b/ / / ahytx{w$$If!vh55#v#v:V ,55/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh555#v#v#v:V ,555/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh555#v#v#v:V ,555/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh555#v#v#v:V ,555/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh555#v#v#v:V ,555/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh555#v#v#v:V ,555/ 4 ayt \tw$$If!vh55#v#v:V ,55/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O555#v#vO#v#v#v:V ,55O555/  / 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O555#v#vO#v#v#v:V y,55O555/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O555#v#vO#v#v#v:V ,55O555/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O555#v#vO#v#v#v:V ,55O555/  / 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O555#v#vO#v#v#v:V y,55O555/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O555#v#vO#v#v#v:V ,55O555/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O555#v#vO#v#v#v:V ,55O555/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O555#v#vO#v#v#v:V ,55O555/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O555#v#vO#v#v#v:V ,55O555/  / 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O555#v#vO#v#v#v:V y,55O555/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55 55#v#v #v#v:V ,55O55/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O555#v#vO#v#v#v:V ,55O555/  / 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O555#v#vO#v#v#v:V y,55O555/ 4 ayt \tw$$If!vh55#v#v:V ,55/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O555#v#vO#v#v#v:V ,55O555/  / 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O555#v#vO#v#v#v:V y,55O555/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O5o 5#v#vO#vo #v:V ,55O55/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O5o 5#v#vO#vo #v:V ,55O55/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O5o 5#v#vO#vo #v:V ,55O55/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O5o 5#v#vO#vo #v:V ,55O55/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O5o 5#v#vO#vo #v:V ,55O55/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O5o 5#v#vO#vo #v:V ,55O55/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O555#v#vO#v#v#v:V ,55O555/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O555#v#vO#v#v#v:V ,55O555/  / 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55O555#v#vO#v#v#v:V y,55O555/ 4 ayt \t$$If!vh55!#v#v!:V 0,55!4 ayt \t$$If!vh55!#v#v!:V 0,55!4 ayt \t$$If!vh55!#v#v!:V 0,55!4 ayt \t$$If!vh55!#v#v!:V 0,55!4 ayt \t$$If!vh55!#v#v!:V 0,55!4 ayt \t$$If!vh55!#v#v!:V 0,55!4 ayt \t$$If!vh55!#v#v!:V 0,55!4 ayt \t$$If!vh55!#v#v!:V 0,55!4 ayt \t$$If!vh55!#v#v!:V 0,55!4 ayt \t$$If!vh55!#v#v!:V 0,55!4 ayt \t$$If!vh55!#v#v!:V 0,55!4 ayt \t$$If!vh55!#v#v!:V 0,55!4 ayt \t$$If!vh55!#v#v!:V 0,55!4 ayt \t$$If!vh55!#v#v!:V 0,55!4 ayt \t$$If!vh55!#v#v!:V 0,55!4 ayt \t$$If!vh55!#v#v!:V 0,55!4 ayt \t$$If!vh55!#v#v!:V 0,55!4 ayt \tj 666666666vvvvvvvvv666666>6666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666hH6666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666662 0@P`p2( 0@P`p 0@P`p 0@P`p 0@P`p 0@P`p 0@P`p8XV~ OJPJQJ_HmH nH sH tH J`J qLNormal dCJ_HaJmH sH tH DA`D Default Paragraph FontRi@R 0 Table Normal4 l4a (k ( 0No List @@@ w List Paragraph ^m$H@H Hx0 Footnote Text dCJaJDD Hx0Footnote Text CharCJaJ@&@!@ Hx0Footnote ReferenceH*F+2F Hx0 Endnote Text dCJaJBAB Hx0Endnote Text CharCJaJ>*Q> Hx0Endnote ReferenceH*>b> &0HeaderdH$.q. &0 Header Char> @> &0FooterdH$.. &0 Footer CharBB oT80Placeholder Text B*phRR oT80 Balloon Text dCJOJQJ^JaJNN oT80Balloon Text CharCJOJQJ^JaJ|`| ~ Table Grid7:V0 dmH sH X`X  \t No Spacing(CJOJPJQJ^J_HaJmH sH tH PK![Content_Types].xmlj0Eжr(΢Iw},-j4 wP-t#bΙ{UTU^hd}㨫)*1P' ^W0)T9<l#$yi};~@(Hu* Dנz/0ǰ $ X3aZ,D0j~3߶b~i>3\`?/[G\!-Rk.sԻ..a濭?PK!֧6 _rels/.relsj0 }Q%v/C/}(h"O = C?hv=Ʌ%[xp{۵_Pѣ<1H0ORBdJE4b$q_6LR7`0̞O,En7Lib/SeеPK!kytheme/theme/themeManager.xml M @}w7c(EbˮCAǠҟ7՛K Y, e.|,H,lxɴIsQ}#Ր ֵ+!,^$j=GW)E+& 8PK!Ptheme/theme/theme1.xmlYOo6w toc'vuر-MniP@I}úama[إ4:lЯGRX^6؊>$ !)O^rC$y@/yH*񄴽)޵߻UDb`}"qۋJחX^)I`nEp)liV[]1M<OP6r=zgbIguSebORD۫qu gZo~ٺlAplxpT0+[}`jzAV2Fi@qv֬5\|ʜ̭NleXdsjcs7f W+Ն7`g ȘJj|h(KD- dXiJ؇(x$( :;˹! I_TS 1?E??ZBΪmU/?~xY'y5g&΋/ɋ>GMGeD3Vq%'#q$8K)fw9:ĵ x}rxwr:\TZaG*y8IjbRc|XŻǿI u3KGnD1NIBs RuK>V.EL+M2#'fi ~V vl{u8zH *:(W☕ ~JTe\O*tHGHY}KNP*ݾ˦TѼ9/#A7qZ$*c?qUnwN%Oi4 =3ڗP 1Pm \\9Mؓ2aD];Yt\[x]}Wr|]g- eW )6-rCSj id DЇAΜIqbJ#x꺃 6k#ASh&ʌt(Q%p%m&]caSl=X\P1Mh9MVdDAaVB[݈fJíP|8 քAV^f Hn- "d>znNJ ة>b&2vKyϼD:,AGm\nziÙ.uχYC6OMf3or$5NHT[XF64T,ќM0E)`#5XY`פ;%1U٥m;R>QD DcpU'&LE/pm%]8firS4d 7y\`JnίI R3U~7+׸#m qBiDi*L69mY&iHE=(K&N!V.KeLDĕ{D vEꦚdeNƟe(MN9ߜR6&3(a/DUz<{ˊYȳV)9Z[4^n5!J?Q3eBoCM m<.vpIYfZY_p[=al-Y}Nc͙ŋ4vfavl'SA8|*u{-ߟ0%M07%<ҍPK! ѐ'theme/theme/_rels/themeManager.xml.relsM 0wooӺ&݈Э5 6?$Q ,.aic21h:qm@RN;d`o7gK(M&$R(.1r'JЊT8V"AȻHu}|$b{P8g/]QAsم(#L[PK-![Content_Types].xmlPK-!֧6 +_rels/.relsPK-!kytheme/theme/themeManager.xmlPK-!Ptheme/theme/theme1.xmlPK-! ѐ' theme/theme/_rels/themeManager.xml.relsPK] h{Zbb  +++.F +{!#[&I)+q/v1 246\:?^CEMq^ehj689:;<=?\ac$!!!!#"$"H"I"m"n"""""""##0#1#]#^#########$$I)J)q)r)))))))**?*@*n*o*******++:+;+_+`+++++151A1L1T1`1j1u1}111111111111222(222=22h66666667.7D7_7t77HSr^d/dcd{ddddeee9e`eeeeeeeeee'fdfffgQgpgvg|ggggggg hh6hIhYhjh}hhhhhYij7>@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[]^_`bdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~ $'.!L# AA@0(  B S  ?ns  6>w { ""z%%))..2277&<*<AAAA;E>EEE G GGGEIHI K KKKrVxVVVVVVVWWWWX"XXXXXkYrYw[[ \ \^^W^Z^^^^^^_ __R_V___`bbbbbbbbbbbbbb  ####22@@EEFFG GGGK KLL M MLMTMV'V2W6WXXXYyY{Y+ZMZs[v[`QbYbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb3333333333333333333333JJ CC```/b/b6b7bbbbbbbbBIγ  L {j/Zpspvr >:R2?r)2^WG_X_6c*ebgkl6n;n^4oZoK$pwp9zsa|s \t=ou)v?v?w_wxk(})~Q||^1ul"u1r'Rb e&``@``!``bp@UnknownG* Times New Roman5Symbol3. * Arial7.{ @Calibri5.*aTahoma?= * Courier New;WingdingsA BCambria Math"1hGGy'qVR1S2!0`mb2QHX  $Pz12!xxToyinProf. A H Ekpo    Oh+'04x  $,ToyinNormalProf. A H Ekpo2Microsoft Office Word@F#@@,~,@,~,qVR՜.+,0 hp  Hewlett-Packard Company1`  Title  !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~      !"#$%&'()*+,-./013456789;<=>?@AFGJRoot Entry F{7IData S1Table5WordDocument 4SummaryInformation(2DocumentSummaryInformation8:MsoDataStore@77PU1ME033ULOVU4==2@77Item  PropertiesUCompObj y   F'Microsoft Office Word 97-2003 Document MSWordDocWord.Document.89q