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Monopsony and Employer Mis-optimization Explain Why Wages Bunch at Round Numbers
Arindrajit Dube
Alan Manning
Suresh Naidu
òòò½Íø Review (Forthcoming)
Abstract
We show that administrative hourly wage data exhibits considerable bunching
at round numbers. We run two experiments, randomizing wages
around 10 cents and $1.00, to experimentally measure left-digit bias for
identical tasks on Amazon Mechanical Turk, and fail to find any evidence
of discontinuity in the labor supply function at round number, despite
estimating a considerable degree of monopsony. We replicate these results in
administrative worker-firm hourly wage data from Oregon. We can rule out
inattention estimates found in the behavioral product market literature. We
provide evidence that firms “misoptimize" wage-setting. More monopsony
requires less employer misoptimization to explain bunching.