Information Systems, Service Delivery, and Corruption: Evidence From the Bangladesh Civil Service

Mattsson, Martin

doi:10.1257/app.20230672

Abstract

Slow public service delivery and corruption are common problems in low- and middle-income countries. Can better management information systems improve delivery speed? Does improving the delivery speed reduce corruption? In a large-scale experiment with the Bangladesh Civil Service, I send monthly scorecards measuring delays in service delivery to government officials and their supervisors. The scorecards increase on-time service delivery by 11% but do not reduce bribes. Instead, the scorecards increase bribes for high-performing bureaucrats. A model where bureaucrats鈥� reputational concerns constrain bribes can explain the results. When positive performance feedback improves bureaucrats鈥� reputations, the constraint is relaxed, and bribes increase.

蝌蚪网

蝌蚪网 Journal:
Applied Economics