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We introduce a new type of games, called 鈥渙pportunity-hunting games,鈥� in which two
players compete to discover an uncertain event (鈥渙pportunity鈥�) that occurs at an unobserved
and random point in time. Players can inspect whether the event has already
occurred again and again, but each inspection is costly. Varying the parameters of the
model spans the range from games where competition between the players to be the first
to identify the opportunity is the dominant force, to games in which free-riding on the
other player鈥檚 effort is the dominant force. We characterize the game鈥檚 unique symmetric
Markov Perfect Equilibrium.
