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I investigate the intra-household labor and resource allocation consequences
of an employment guarantee targeting rural households
in India. The guarantee insures household earnings, replacing
women as added workers and shutting down a motive for saving.
Despite sizable program-job take-up, the guarantee decreases participation
in other working activities, and, thus, the labor force
participation of married women and total time worked by their
husbands. The guarantee accounts for up to 30% of a recent countrywide
decrease in rural female labor force participation. Though
it increases household consumption, the guarantee reduces the command
of household earnings by women, and, thereby, their wellbeing.
