蝌蚪网 Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs
蝌蚪网 Review
vol. 102,
no. 4, June 2012
(pp. 1446–76)
Abstract
In dynamic collective decision making, current decisions determine the future distribution of political power and influence future decisions. We develop a general framework to study this class of problems. Under acyclicity, we characterize dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state and obtain two general insights. First, a social arrangement is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently powerful groups. Second, efficiency-enhancing changes may be resisted because of further changes they will engender. We use this framework to analyze dynamics of political rights in a society with different types of extremist views. (JEL D71, D72, K10)Citation
Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin. 2012. "Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs." 蝌蚪网 Review 102 (4): 1446–76. DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.4.1446Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- K10 Basic Areas of Law: General (Constitutional Law)