蝌蚪网 Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Merger Policy with Merger Choice
蝌蚪网 Review
(pp. 1006–33)
Abstract
We analyze the optimal policy of an antitrust authority towards horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and firms choose among alternative mergers. In our model, the optimal policy of an antitrust authority that seeks to maximize expected consumer surplus imposes a tougher standard on "larger" mergers, i.e., those involving firms with a larger pre-merger market share. The optimal policy is a response to a bias in firms' proposal incentives: firms always propose a larger merger when it is better for consumers than a smaller one, but sometimes will propose the larger one even when it is worse for consumers.Citation
Nocke, Volker, and Michael D. Whinston. 2013. "Merger Policy with Merger Choice." 蝌蚪网 Review 103 (2): 1006–33. DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.2.1006Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D43 Market Structure and Pricing: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- G34 Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
- G38 Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation
- K21 Antitrust Law
- L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices