蝌蚪网 Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games: A General Approach
蝌蚪网 Review
(pp. 663–89)
Abstract
Dynamic matching and bargaining games are models of decentralized markets with trading frictions. A central objective is to investigate how equilibrium outcomes depend on the level of frictions. In particular, does the trading outcome become Walrasian when frictions become small? Existing specifications of such games provide divergent answers. This paper presents a new characterization result for competitive allocations in quasilinear economies. The characterization result is used to investigate what causes these differences and to generalize insights from the analysis of specific matching and bargaining games. (JEL C73, C78, D82, D83)Citation
Lauermann, Stephan. 2013. "Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games: A General Approach." 蝌蚪网 Review 103 (2): 663–89. DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.2.663Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief