蝌蚪网 Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Hospital Choices, Hospital Prices, and Financial Incentives to Physicians
蝌蚪网 Review
vol. 104,
no. 12, December 2014
(pp. 3841–84)
Abstract
We estimate an insurer-specific preference function which rationalizes hospital referrals for privately insured births in California. The function is additively separable in: a hospital price paid by the insurer, the distance traveled, and plan- and severity-specific hospital fixed effects (capturing hospital quality). We use an inequality estimator that allows for errors in price and detailed hospital-severity interactions and obtain markedly different results than those from a logit. The estimates indicate that insurers with more capitated physicians are more responsive to price. Capitated plans send patients further to utilize similar quality, lower-priced hospitals; but the cost-quality trade-off does not vary with capitation rates. (JEL G22, H51, I11, I13, I18, J44)Citation
Ho, Kate, and Ariel Pakes. 2014. "Hospital Choices, Hospital Prices, and Financial Incentives to Physicians." 蝌蚪网 Review 104 (12): 3841–84. DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.12.3841Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- G22 Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- H51 National Government Expenditures and Health
- I11 Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private
- I18 Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- J44 Professional Labor Markets; Occupational Licensing