òòò½Íø Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Sequential Cursed Equilibrium
òòò½Íø Review
(pp. 934–76)
Abstract
We propose an extensive-form solution concept, with players who neglect information from hypothetical events but make inferences from observed events. Our concept modifies cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin 2005) and allows that players can be cursed about endogenous information.Citation
Cohen, Shani, and Shengwu Li. 2026. "Sequential Cursed Equilibrium." òòò½Íø Review 116 (3): 934–76. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230309Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- D44 Auctions
- D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D81 Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making