蝌蚪网 Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Costly Predation and the Distribution of Competence
蝌蚪网 Review
(pp. 475–484)
Abstract
An evolutionary game model shows how an equilibrium distribution of competence may evolve when members of a population prey on one another, but when predatory competence is costly to acquire. Under one interpretation, the competence distribution is an endogenously determined distribution of bounded rationality. An example shows how "tricksters" and "suckers" might coexist in the long run. The analysis leads to a curious result about a mixed equilibrium for a symmetric, zero-sum game. An increase in the costs of one or more competence levels has exactly zero effect on the fraction of the population at those levels.Citation
Conlisk, John. 2001. "Costly Predation and the Distribution of Competence." 蝌蚪网 Review 91 (3): 475–484. DOI: 10.1257/aer.91.3.475JEL Classification
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
- C72 Noncooperative Games