蝌蚪网 Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Superstition and Rational Learning
蝌蚪网 Review
(pp. 630–651)
Abstract
We argue that some, but not all, superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players are patient, and illustrate our argument with an example inspired by the Code of Hammurabi. The code specified an "appeal by surviving in the river" as a way of deciding whether an accusation was true. According to our theory, a mechanism that uses superstitions two or more steps off the equilibrium path, such as "appeal by surviving in the river," is more likely to persist than a superstition where the false beliefs are only one step off the equilibrium path. (JEL C72, C73, D83, D84)Citation
Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning." 蝌蚪网 Review 96 (3): 630–651. DOI: 10.1257/aer.96.3.630JEL Classification
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief