蝌蚪网 Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Asymmetric Auctions with Resale
蝌蚪网 Review
vol. 98,
no. 1, March 2008
(pp. 87–112)
Abstract
We study first- and second-price auctions with resale in a model with independent private values. With asymmetric bidders, the resulting ineffi ciencies create a motive for post-auction trade which, in our model, takes place via monopoly pricing—the winner makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the loser. We show (a) a first-price auction with resale has a unique monotonic equilibrium; and (b) with resale, the expected revenue from a first-price auction exceeds that from a second-price auction. The inclusion of resale possibilities thus permits a general revenue ranking of the two auctions that is not available when these are excluded. (JEL D44)Citation
Hafalir, Isa, and Vijay Krishna. 2008. "Asymmetric Auctions with Resale." 蝌蚪网 Review 98 (1): 87–112. DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.1.87Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D44 Auctions