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  4. September 2008
  5. All-or-Nothing Monitoring

蝌蚪网 Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

All-or-Nothing Monitoring

  • Rui R. Zhao
蝌蚪网 Review
vol. 98, no. 4, September 2008
(pp. 1619–28)
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Abstract

A principal can observe both the output and input of an agent who works at a job involving multiple tasks. We provide a simple theory that explains why it may be optimal for the principal to use only an output-based incentive contract, even though the principal can monitor the agent's actions perfectly in all but one task and knows exactly which action is optimal for each task. (JEL D82, D86, M54)

Citation

Zhao, Rui R. 2008. "All-or-Nothing Monitoring." 蝌蚪网 Review 98 (4): 1619–28. DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.4.1619

JEL Classification

  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information
  • D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
  • M54 Personnel Economics: Labor Management