òòò½Íø Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Specifying a Structural Matching Game of Trading Networks with Transferable Utility
òòò½Íø Review
vol. 107,
no. 5, May 2017
(pp. 256–60)
Abstract
Structural estimation of matching games with transferable utility, including matching games of trading networks and many-to-many matching, is increasingly popular in empirical work. I explore several modeling decisions that need to be made when specifying a structural model for a matching game. One decision is the choice of a game theoretic solution concept to impose in the structural model. I discuss pairwise stability, competitive equilibrium, and noncooperative games such as auctions. Another decision is whether to work with a continuum of agents or a finite number of agents. I explore other issues as well.Citation
Fox, Jeremy T. 2017. "Specifying a Structural Matching Game of Trading Networks with Transferable Utility." òòò½Íø Review 107 (5): 256–60. DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171114Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D40 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
- D85 Network Formation and Analysis: Theory