蝌蚪网 Journal:
Applied Economics
ISSN 1945-7782 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7790 (Online)
Incentivized Peer Referrals for Tuberculosis Screening: Evidence from India
蝌蚪网 Journal: Applied Economics
vol. 15,
no. 1, January 2023
(pp. 259–91)
Abstract
We study whether and how peer referrals increase screening, testing, and identification of patients with tuberculosis, an infectious disease responsible for over one million deaths annually. In an experiment with 3,176 patients at 122 tuberculosis treatment centers in India, we find that small financial incentives raise the probability that existing patients refer prospective patients for screening and testing, resulting in cost-effective identification of new cases. Incentivized referrals operate through two mechanisms: peers have private information about individuals in their social networks to target for outreach, and they are more effective than health workers in inducing these individuals to get tested.Citation
Goldberg, Jessica, Mario Macis, and Pradeep Chintagunta. 2023. "Incentivized Peer Referrals for Tuberculosis Screening: Evidence from India." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Applied Economics 15 (1): 259–91. DOI: 10.1257/app.20200721Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- H51 National Government Expenditures and Health
- I12 Health Behavior
- I18 Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
- Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification