蝌蚪网 Journal:
Applied Economics
ISSN 1945-7782 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7790 (Online)
Contagious Dishonesty: Corruption Scandals and Supermarket Theft
蝌蚪网 Journal: Applied Economics
vol. 15,
no. 4, October 2023
(pp. 218–51)
Abstract
Is dishonest behavior contagious? We answer this question by studying whether corruption scandals affect the propensity of supermarket customers to steal while using a self-service checkout system. Crucially, this system allows shoppers to engage in dishonest behavior by underreporting the value of their shopping cart. Exploiting data from random audits on shoppers, we show that the probability of stealing increases by 16 percent after a local corruption scandal breaks. This effect is not driven by any change in material incentives. Suggestive evidence shows that it is driven by a reduction in the self-imposed cost of stealing.Citation
Gulino, Giorgio, and Federico Masera. 2023. "Contagious Dishonesty: Corruption Scandals and Supermarket Theft." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Applied Economics 15 (4): 218–51. DOI: 10.1257/app.20210446Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
- K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L81 Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
- Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification