蝌蚪网 Journal:
Applied Economics
ISSN 1945-7782 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7790 (Online)
When Do Politicians Appeal Broadly? The Economic Consequences of Electoral Rules in Brazil
蝌蚪网 Journal: Applied Economics
vol. 15,
no. 3, July 2023
(pp. 183–209)
Abstract
Electoral rules determine how voters' preferences are aggregated and translated into political representation. Using a regression discontinuity design, I contrast single- and two-round elections in Brazil. In two-round elections, the eventual winner must obtain at least 50 percent of the vote. I show that two-round elections provide incentives for candidates to secure a broader base of support and provide public goods more broadly. Candidates represent a more geographically diverse group of voters, public schools have more resources, and there is less variation in resources across schools. Effects appear to be driven by strategic responses of candidates rather than differential entry into races.Citation
Chin, Moya. 2023. "When Do Politicians Appeal Broadly? The Economic Consequences of Electoral Rules in Brazil." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Applied Economics 15 (3): 183–209. DOI: 10.1257/app.20210529Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H41 Public Goods
- H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
- I21 Analysis of Education
- I28 Education: Government Policy
- O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
- O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements