òòò½Íø Journal:
Applied Economics
ISSN 1945-7782 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7790 (Online)
Civil Service Exams and Organizational Performance: Evidence from the Pendleton Act
òòò½Íø Journal: Applied Economics
vol. 16,
no. 3, July 2024
(pp. 250–91)
Abstract
We use newly digitized data to study the impacts of a historical reform that mandated exams for some employees in the largest US customs-collection districts. Although the reform improved targeted employees' professional backgrounds and reduced turnover, it did not lead to significant improvements in the cost-effectiveness of customs revenue collection. The incomplete reach of the reform was key for this partial success. First, the reform incentivized hiring in exam-exempted positions, distorting districts' hierarchical structure. Second, since we find suggestive evidence that districts' top managers mattered for performance, not changing their appointment method might have constituted a missed opportunity for improvement.Citation
Moreira, Diana, and Santiago Pérez. 2024. "Civil Service Exams and Organizational Performance: Evidence from the Pendleton Act." òòò½Íø Journal: Applied Economics 16 (3): 250–91. DOI: 10.1257/app.20220284Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D23 Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H83 Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
- J45 Public Sector Labor Markets
- N31 Economic History: Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy: U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
- N41 Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913