蝌蚪网 Journal:
Applied Economics
ISSN 1945-7782 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7790 (Online)
Salary History and Employer Demand: Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit
蝌蚪网 Journal: Applied Economics
(pp. 380–413)
Abstract
We study how salary disclosures affect employer demand using a field experiment featuring hundreds of recruiters evaluating over 2,000 job applications. We randomize the presence of salary questions and the candidates' disclosures for male and female applicants. Our findings suggest that extra dollars disclosed yield higher salary offers, willingness to pay, and perceptions of outside options by recruiters (all similarly for men and women). Recruiters make negative inferences about the quality and bargaining positions of nondisclosing candidates, though they penalize silent women less.Citation
Agan, Amanda Y., Bo Cowgill, and Laura K. Gee. 2025. "Salary History and Employer Demand: Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Applied Economics 17 (3): 380–413. DOI: 10.1257/app.20230365Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C93 Field Experiments
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J22 Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- J23 Labor Demand
- J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials