òòò½Íø Journal:
Applied Economics
ISSN 1945-7782 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7790 (Online)
Detection of Collusive Networks in Multistage Auctions
òòò½Íø Journal: Applied Economics
(pp. 439–71)
Abstract
We develop a method for detecting cartels in multistage auctions. Our approach allows firms to act collusively against cartel members yet competitively otherwise. In these auctions, bidders submit initial bids and can later revise them downward. As initial bids are shaded, close initial bids indicate similar costs and thus create strong incentives to undercut rivals. We classify firm pairs as collusive if they ignore this incentive by failing to update bids against each other, relative to other pairs with similarly close initial bids. Our algorithm predicts Ukraine's Antimonopoly Committee sanctions: Classified pairs are nine times more likely to be sanctioned.Citation
Baránek, Bruno, Leon Musolff, and VÃtÄ›zslav Titl. 2026. "Detection of Collusive Networks in Multistage Auctions." òòò½Íø Journal: Applied Economics 18 (4): 439–71. DOI: 10.1257/app.20240232Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D22 Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- D44 Auctions
- H57 National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
- K21 Antitrust Law
- L12 Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- P31 Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
- P35 Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions: Public Economics