蝌蚪网 Journal:
Applied Economics
ISSN 1945-7782 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7790 (Online)
Do Social Connections Reduce Moral Hazard? Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry
蝌蚪网 Journal: Applied Economics
vol. 3,
no. 3, July 2011
(pp. 244–67)
Abstract
This study investigates the role of social networks in aligning the incentives of agents in settings with incomplete contracts. Specifically, the study examines the New York City taxi industry where taxis are often leased and lessee-drivers have worse driving outcomes than owner-drivers due to moral hazard. Using within-driver variation and instrumental variable strategies to remove selection, we find that drivers leasing from members of their country-of-birth community exhibit significantly reduced effects of moral hazard, representing an improvement of almost one-half of a standard deviation of the outcome measures. Screening is ruled out as an explanation, and other mechanisms are investigated. (JEL D82, D86, L92, Z13)Citation
Jackson, C. Kirabo, and Henry S. Schneider. 2011. "Do Social Connections Reduce Moral Hazard? Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Applied Economics 3 (3): 244–67. DOI: 10.1257/app.3.3.244Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information
- D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
- L92 Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
- Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification