蝌蚪网 Journal:
Applied Economics
ISSN 1945-7782 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7790 (Online)
Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin
蝌蚪网 Journal: Applied Economics
vol. 5,
no. 4, October 2013
(pp. 241–55)
Abstract
This paper studies the electoral effects of town hall meetings based on programmatic, nonclientelist platforms. The experiment involves the cooperation of leading candidates in a presidential election in Benin. A campaign strategy based solely on these meetings was assigned to randomly selected villages and compared to the standard strategy of clientelist rallies. We find that treatment reduces the prevalence of clientelism and does not affect turnout. Treatment also lowers the vote shares for the candidate with a political stronghold in the village and is more effective in garnering votes in regions where a candidate does not have a political stronghold.Citation
Fujiwara, Thomas, and Leonard Wantchekon. 2013. "Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Applied Economics 5 (4): 241–55. DOI: 10.1257/app.5.4.241Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements