Journal of Economic Literature
ISSN 0022-0515 (Print) | ISSN 2328-8175 (Online)
Game Theory and the First World War
Journal of Economic Literature
(pp. 716–35)
Abstract
Books by Scott Wolford and Roger Ransom show how economic theories of games and decisions can be fruitfully applied to problems in World War I. This vital application offers fundamental insights into the analytical methods of game theory. Public random variables may be essential factors in war-of-attrition games. An assumption that nations can coordinate on Pareto-superior equilibria may become less tenable when nations are at war. Interpreting a surprising mistake as evidence of an unlikely type can have serious consequences. The ability of leaders to foster consistent beliefs within a cohesive society can create inconsistency of beliefs between nations at war.Citation
Myerson, Roger B. 2023. "Game Theory and the First World War." Journal of Economic Literature 61 (2): 716–35. DOI: 10.1257/jel.20211571Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C70 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
- D74 Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- F51 International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
- N40 Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: General, International, or Comparative