蝌蚪网 Journal:
Macroeconomics
ISSN 1945-7707 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7715 (Online)
Labor Contracts, Equal Treatment, and Wage-Unemployment Dynamics
蝌蚪网 Journal: Macroeconomics
vol. 2,
no. 3, July 2010
(pp. 98–127)
Abstract
This paper analyses a model in which firms cannot pay discriminate based on year of entry. It is assumed that workers can costlessly quit at any time, while firms are committed to contracts. We solve for the dynamics of wages and unemployment, and show that real wages display a degree of downward rigidity and do not necessarily clear the labor market. Using sectoral productivity data from the post-war US economy, we assess the ability of the model to match the actual unemployment series. We also show that equal treatment follows from the assumption of at-will employment contracting in our model. (JEL E24, E32, J31, J41)Citation
Snell, Andy, and Jonathan P. Thomas. 2010. "Labor Contracts, Equal Treatment, and Wage-Unemployment Dynamics." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Macroeconomics 2 (3): 98–127. DOI: 10.1257/mac.2.3.98Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- E24 Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital
- E32 Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J41 Labor Contracts