蝌蚪网 Journal:
Macroeconomics
ISSN 1945-7707 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7715 (Online)
An Analytical Model of Behavior and Policy in an Epidemic
蝌蚪网 Journal: Macroeconomics
(pp. 136–73)
Abstract
This paper examines the behavior of individuals susceptible to a deadly disease in a tractable equilibrium setting. We analytically characterize individually optimal mitigation behavior and the resulting equilibrium trajectory. Analysis is facilitated by a phase diagram. A key insight is that individually optimal behavior of those susceptible to the disease results in excessive caution. This behavior flattens the epidemic curve and prolongs the epidemic. In contrast, socially optimal behavior results in a higher infection rate, with a focus on minimizing cumulative deaths at minimum cost. The paper offers novel technical contributions and an improved understanding of externalities in econ-epi models.Citation
Rachel, Lukasz. 2026. "An Analytical Model of Behavior and Policy in an Epidemic." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Macroeconomics 18 (3): 136–73. DOI: 10.1257/mac.20230299Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D62 Externalities
- D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
- I12 Health Behavior
- I18 Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health