蝌蚪网 Journal:
Macroeconomics
ISSN 1945-7707 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7715 (Online)
Search, Screening, and Sorting
蝌蚪网 Journal: Macroeconomics
vol. 17,
no. 3, July 2025
(pp. 205–36)
Abstract
We examine how search frictions impact labor market sorting by constructing a model consistent with evidence that employers interview a subset of a pool of applicants. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for sorting in applications and matches. Positive sorting is obtained when production complementarities outweigh a counterforce measured by a (novel) quality-quantity elasticity. Interestingly, the threshold for the complementarities depends on the fraction of high-type workers and can be increasing in the number of interviews. Our model shows how policies like Ban the Box can backfire because when screening workers becomes harder, firms may discourage certain workers from applying.Citation
Cai, Xiaoming, Pieter Gautier, and Ronald Wolthoff. 2025. "Search, Screening, and Sorting." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Macroeconomics 17 (3): 205–36. DOI: 10.1257/mac.20240026Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D22 Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- J23 Labor Demand
- M51 Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions