蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 182–206)
Abstract
We consider bargaining problems in which parties have access to outside options, the size of the pie is commonly known and each party privately knows the realization of her outside option. We allow for correlations in the distributions of outside options. Parties have a veto right, which allows them to obtain at least their outside option payoff in any event. Besides, agents can receive no subsidy ex post. We show that inefficiencies are inevitable whatever the exact form of correlation, as long as private information is dispersed. We also illustrate how veto constraints differ from ex post participation constraints. (JEL C78, D82)Citation
Compte, Olivier, and Philippe Jehiel. 2009. "Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 1 (1): 182–206. DOI: 10.1257/mic.1.1.182JEL Classification
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information