蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 34–63)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets. A school may suppress some information about students in order to improve their average job placement. We consider a setting with many schools, students, and jobs, and show that if early contracting is impossible, the same, "balanced" amount of information is disclosed in essentially all equilibria. When early contracting is allowed and information arrives gradually, if schools disclose the balanced amount of information, students and employers will not find it profitable to contract early. If they disclose more, some students and employers will prefer to sign contracts before all information is revealed. (JEL C78, D82, D83)Citation
Ostrovsky, Michael, and Michael Schwarz. 2010. "Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 2 (2): 34–63. DOI: 10.1257/mic.2.2.34JEL Classification
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief