蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Affiliation and Entry in First-Price Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders: An Analysis of Merger Effects
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 7,
no. 2, May 2015
(pp. 188–214)
Abstract
We study the effects of mergers in timber sale auctions in Oregon. We propose an entry and bidding model within the affiliated private value (APV) framework and with heterogeneous bidders, and establish existence of the entry equilibrium and existence and uniqueness of the bidding equilibrium when the joint distribution of private values belongs to the class of Archimedean copulas. We estimate the resulting structural model, and study merger effects through counterfactual analyses using the structural estimates. We evaluate how merger effects depend on affiliation, entry, and the auction mechanism and find that the seller may benefit from some mergers. (JEL C57, D44, G34, L11, L73)Citation
Li, Tong, and Bingyu Zhang. 2015. "Affiliation and Entry in First-Price Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders: An Analysis of Merger Effects." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 7 (2): 188–214. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20110106Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C57 Econometrics of Games and Auctions
- D44 Auctions
- G34 Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
- L11 Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L73 Forest Products