蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 8,
no. 3, August 2016
(pp. 119–55)
Abstract
This paper explores the implications of costly information acquisition in a strategic communication setting. We show that equilibrium decisions based on a biased expert's advice may be more precise than when information is directly acquired by the decision maker, even if the expert is not more efficient than the decision maker at acquiring information. This result bears important implications for organization design. Communication by an expert to a decision maker may often outperform delegation of the decision-making authority to the expert, as well as centralization by the decision maker of both information acquisition and decision-making authority.Citation
Argenziano, Rossella, Sergei Severinov, and Francesco Squintani. 2016. "Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 8 (3): 119–55. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140135Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C72 Noncooperative Games
- D23 Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness