蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Conditional Retrospective Voting in Large Elections
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 54–75)
Abstract
We introduce a solution concept in the context of large elections with private information by embedding a model of boundedly rational voters into an otherwise standard equilibrium setting. A retrospective voting equilibrium (RVE) formalizes the idea that voters evaluate alternatives based on past performance. Since counterfactual outcomes are not observed, the sample from which voters learn is potentially biased, leading to systematically biased beliefs in equilibrium. We provide an explicit learning foundation for RVE and contrast it to standard solution concepts in the literature.Citation
Esponda, Ignacio, and Demian Pouzo. 2017. "Conditional Retrospective Voting in Large Elections." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 9 (2): 54–75. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140283Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness