蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Competition in Treasury Auctions
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 157–84)
Abstract
We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria's EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance. We find robust evidence that bidders' surplus dropped sharply after EU accession, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. The difference can be explained by reduced form estimates not taking into account the increase in valuations upon EU accession.Citation
Elsinger, Helmut, Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, and Christine Zulehner. 2019. "Competition in Treasury Auctions." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 11 (1): 157–84. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170039Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D44 Auctions
- E63 Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
- G21 Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- H63 National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt