蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 250–76)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
Short-lived buyers arrive to a platform over time and randomly match with sellers. The sellers stay at the platform and decide whether to accept incoming requests. The platform designs what buyer information the sellers observe before deciding to form a match. We show full information disclosure leads to a market failure because of excessive rejections by the sellers. If sellers are homogeneous, then coarse information policies are able to restore efficiency. If sellers are heterogeneous, then simple censorship policies are often constrained efficient as shown by a method of calculus of variations.Citation
Romanyuk, Gleb, and Alex Smolin. 2019. "Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 11 (2): 250–76. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170154Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness