蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 243–98)
Abstract
Two heterogeneous agents contribute over time to a joint project and collectively decide its scale. A larger scale requires greater cumulative effort and delivers higher benefits upon completion. We show that the efficient agent prefers a smaller scale, and preferences are time-inconsistent: as the project progresses, the efficient (inefficient) agent's preferred scale shrinks (expands). We characterize the equilibrium outcomes under dictatorship and unanimity, with and without commitment. We find that an agent's degree of efficiency is a key determinant of control over the project scale. From a welfare perspective, it may be desirable to allocate decision rights to the inefficient agent.Citation
Bowen, T. Renee, George Georgiadis, and Nicolas S. Lambert. 2019. "Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 11 (1): 243–98. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170217Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- H43 Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate