蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Sequential Preference Revelation in Incomplete Information Settings
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 13,
no. 1, February 2021
(pp. 116–47)
Abstract
Strategy-proof allocation rules incentivize truthfulness in simultaneous move games, but real world mechanisms sometimes elicit preferences sequentially. Surprisingly, even when the underlying rule is strategy-proof and nonbossy, sequential elicitation can yield equilibria where agents have a strict incentive to be untruthful. This occurs only under incomplete information, when an agent anticipates that truthful reporting would signal false private information about others' preferences. We provide conditions ruling out this phenomenon, guaranteeing all equilibrium outcomes to be welfare-equivalent to truthful ones.Citation
Schummer, James, and Rodrigo A. Velez. 2021. "Sequential Preference Revelation in Incomplete Information Settings." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 13 (1): 116–47. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180065Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- D45 Rationing; Licensing
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness