蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 144–69)
Abstract
In many contests in economic and political life, both all-pay and winner-pay expenditures matter for winning. This paper studies such hybrid contests under symmetry and asymmetry. The symmetric model assumes very little structure but yields a simple closed-form solution. More contestants tend to lead to substitution toward winner-pay investments, and total expenditures are always lower than in the corresponding all-pay contest. With a biased decision process and two contestants, the favored contestant wins with a higher likelihood, chooses less winner-pay investments, and contributes more to total expenditures. An endogenous bias that maximizes total expenditures disfavors the high-valuation contestant but still makes her the more likely one to win.Citation
Lagerl枚f, Johan N M. 2020. "Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 12 (4): 144–69. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180107Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C72 Noncooperative Games
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design