òòò½Íø Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
The Value of Incumbency When Platforms Face Heterogeneous Customers
òòò½Íø Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 12,
no. 4, November 2020
(pp. 229–69)
Abstract
We study competition for the market in a dynamic model with network externalities, focusing on the efficiency of market outcomes. We propose a representation of the strategic advantages of incumbency and embed it in a dynamic framework with heterogeneous consumers. Then, we completely identify the conditions under which inefficient equilibria with several platforms emerge at equilibrium; explore the reasons why these inefficient equilibria arise; and compute the value of incumbency and analyze why static models generally exaggerate it.Citation
Biglaiser, Gary, and Jacques Crémer. 2020. "The Value of Incumbency When Platforms Face Heterogeneous Customers." òòò½Íø Journal: Microeconomics 12 (4): 229–69. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180225Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D43 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D62 Externalities
- L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L86 Information and Internet Services; Computer Software