蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Designing Dynamic Research Contests
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 270–89)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
This paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where (i) the principal can stop the contest in any period, (ii) a constant interim transfer is paid to agents in each period while the contest is ongoing, and (iii) a final prize is paid once the principal stops the contest, is optimal for the principal and implements the first-best.Citation
Benkert, Jean-Michel, and Igor Letina. 2020. "Designing Dynamic Research Contests." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 12 (4): 270–89. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180263Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- O32 Management of Technological Innovation and R&D