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  3. 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
  4. May 2021
  5. Common-Value Public Goods and Informational Social Dilemmas

蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

Common-Value Public Goods and Informational Social Dilemmas

  • Caleb A. Cox
  • Brock Stoddard
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 13, no. 2, May 2021
(pp. 343–69)
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Abstract

We experimentally examine private information and communication in a public goods environment with uncertain returns. We consider a common-value public goods game in which the return to contribution is either high or low. Before contributing, three players observe private signals correlated with the return and send cheap talk messages to one another. There are social gains from truthfulness, but a private incentive to exaggerate. We compare treatments with and without cheap talk, finding that communication is largely truthful and increases efficiency. In further treatments, we increase the incentive to exaggerate and find reduced truthfulness and smaller gains from communication.

Citation

Cox, Caleb A., and Brock Stoddard. 2021. "Common-Value Public Goods and Informational Social Dilemmas." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 13 (2): 343–69. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180275

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C72 Noncooperative Games
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
  • D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
  • H41 Public Goods