蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 186–215)
Abstract
We study the effect of how types are assigned to participants in a signaling-game experiment. The sender has two actions, In and Out, and two types. In one treatment, types are i.i.d. in every period, and senders gather experience with both types. In the other, types are assigned once-and-for-all, and feedback is type specific. The theory of learning in games predicts that the non-Nash but self-confirming equilibrium where some fraction of types play Out can persist in the fixed-type treatment but not when types are i.i.d. Our results confirm that more senders do play Out in the fixed-type treatment.Citation
Fudenberg, Drew, and Emanuel Vespa. 2019. "Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 11 (4): 186–215. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180317Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness