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  3. 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
  4. November 2021
  5. A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise

蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise

  • Attila Ambrus
  • Volodymyr Baranovskyi
  • Aaron Kolb
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 13, no. 4, November 2021
(pp. 373–419)
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Abstract

We investigate information aggregation and competition in a delegation framework. An uninformed principal is unable to perform a task herself and must choose between one of two biased and imperfectly informed experts. In the focal equilibrium, experts exaggerate their biases, anticipating an ideological winner's curse. We show that having a second expert can benefit the principal, even when equally or more biased than the first expert. The principal can benefit from commitment to an "element of surprise" and prefers experts with equal rather than opposite biases.

Citation

Ambrus, Attila, Volodymyr Baranovskyi, and Aaron Kolb. 2021. "A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 13 (4): 373–419. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190008

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
  • D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness