蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 556–82)
Abstract
In the context of priority-based allocation of objects, we formulate methods to compare assignments in terms of their stability. We introduce three basic properties that a reasonable stability comparison should satisfy. We show that for any stability comparison satisfying the three properties, the top trading cycles mechanism is minimally unstable among efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms when objects have unit capacities. Our unifying approach covers basically all natural stability comparisons and establishes the robustness of a recent result by Abdulkadiro臒lu et al. (2020). When objects have nonunit capacities, we characterize the capacity-priority structures for which our result is preserved.Citation
Do臒an, Battal, and Lars Ehlers. 2022. "Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 14 (4): 556–82. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200148Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C70 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D61 Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design