蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
When Is a Contrarian Adviser Optimal?
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 434–66)
Abstract
We compare contrarian to conformist advice, a contrarian expert being one whose preference bias is against the decision-maker's prior optimal decision. Optimality of an expert depends on characteristics of prior information and learning. If either the expert is fully informed or fine information can be acquired cheaply, then for symmetric distributions F of the state, a conformist (contrarian) is superior if F is single peaked (bimodal). If only coarse information can be acquired, then a contrarian acquires more on average and hence is superior. If information is verifiable, a contrarian has less incentive to hide unfavorable evidence and again is superior.Citation
Evans, Robert, and S枚nje Reiche. 2023. "When Is a Contrarian Adviser Optimal?" 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 15 (1): 434–66. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200204Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- G34 Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
- H71 State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- I12 Health Behavior
- L94 Electric Utilities