òòò½Íø Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment
òòò½Íø Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 394–419)
Abstract
This paper exploits a large-scale auction experiment conducted by two Chinese government treasury security issuers—the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank—to investigate whether treasury securities should be sold through uniform price or discriminatory price auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically different. Further, these estimates indicate there is no significant economic difference in terms of revenue between the two auction mechanisms. This result is robust across different bond yield-rate measurements and participation behavior.Citation
Barbosa, Klenio, Dakshina G. De Silva, Liyu Yang, and Hisayuki Yoshimoto. 2022. "Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment." òòò½Íø Journal: Microeconomics 14 (4): 394–419. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200216Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D44 Auctions
- E63 Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
- G12 Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
- O16 Economic Development: Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
- P34 Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions: Financial Economics