蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 296–317)
Abstract
The Bayesian persuasion model studies communication between an informed sender and a receiver with a payoff-relevant action, emphasizing the ability of a sender to extract maximal surplus from his informational advantage. In this paper, we study a setting with multiple senders in which the receiver is restricted to choosing, at the interim stage, one sender with whom to interact. Our main result is that whenever senders are uncertain about each other's preferences and, in particular, cannot dismiss with certainty the possibility that others are aligned with the receiver, the receiver receives all the informational surplus in all equilibria.Citation
Gradwohl, Ronen, Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, and Rann Smorodinsky. 2022. "Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 14 (4): 296–317. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200399Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C72 Noncooperative Games
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness