蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Ideological Bias and Trust in Information Sources
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 162–213)
Abstract
We study the role of endogenous trust in amplifying ideological bias. Agents in our model learn a sequence of states from sources whose accuracy is ex ante uncertain. Agents learn these accuracies by comparing their own reasoning about the states based on introspection or direct experience to the sources' reports. Small biases in this reasoning can cause large ideological differences in the agents' trust in information sources and their beliefs about the states, and may lead agents to become overconfident in their own reasoning. Disagreements can be similar in magnitude whether agents see only ideologically aligned sources or diverse sources.Citation
Gentzkow, Matthew, Michael B. Wong, and Allen T. Zhang. 2025. "Ideological Bias and Trust in Information Sources." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 17 (2): 162–213. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210406Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D42 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- L25 Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
- L82 Entertainment; Media
- Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification