蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Complementary Bidding and the Collusive Arrangement: Evidence from an Antitrust Investigation
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 17,
no. 2, May 2025
(pp. 66–93)
Abstract
Clustered bids and a missing mass of nearly tied bids have both been proposed as markers of collusion. We present causal empirical evidence from an actual procurement cartel that bidding involves both clustering and a gap around the winning bid. We support these results with information from the testimony of cartel participants that explains how both patterns arise naturally as part of an arrangement featuring complementary bidding. Based on these findings, we develop an easy-to-implement screen for collusive arrangements featuring complementary bidding.Citation
Clark, Robert, Decio Coviello, and Adriano De Leverano. 2025. "Complementary Bidding and the Collusive Arrangement: Evidence from an Antitrust Investigation." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 17 (2): 66–93. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210450Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D43 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D44 Auctions
- H76 State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories
- L12 Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L74 Construction