蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing with Asymmetric Information: Implications for Horizontal Mergers
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 345–73)
Abstract
We model repeated pricing by differentiated product firms when each firm has private information about its serially correlated marginal cost. In a fully separating equilibrium of the dynamic game, signaling incentives can lead equilibrium prices to be significantly above those in a static, complete information game, even when the possible variation in the privately observed state variables is very limited. We calibrate our model using data from the beer industry and show that, without any change in conduct, our model can explain increases in price levels and changes in price dynamics and cost pass-through after the 2008 MillerCoors joint venture.Citation
Sweeting, Andrew, Xuezhen Tao, and Xinlu Yao. 2024. "Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing with Asymmetric Information: Implications for Horizontal Mergers." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 16 (3): 345–73. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220051Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- D43 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G34 Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
- L24 Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing
- L41 Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L66 Food; Beverages; Cosmetics; Tobacco; Wine and Spirits