蝌蚪网 Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Persistent Protests
蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 17,
no. 2, May 2025
(pp. 321–57)
Abstract
A continuum of citizens with heterogeneous opportunity costs participates in a protest with well-defined demands. As long as the government doesn't concede, it pays a cost increasing in time and participation. Citizens who are part of the victory team enjoy a "veteran reward." Every equilibrium with protest displays a buildup stage during which citizens join the protest but the government ignores them, a peak at which the government concedes with positive probability, and a decay stage in which the government concedes with some density and citizens continuously drop out. The set of equilibria is fully described by the peak time.Citation
Correa, Sofia. 2025. "Persistent Protests." 蝌蚪网 Journal: Microeconomics 17 (2): 321–57. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220191Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D11 Consumer Economics: Theory
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions